Are You Listening, America?

Are You Listening, America?

Don’t you understand what I’m trying to say? And can’t you feel the
fears I’m feeling today? If the button is pushed, there’s no running
away, there’ll be no one to save with the world in a grave. Take a
look around you, boy, it’s bound to scare you, boy, and you tell me
over and over and over again my friend, ah you don’t believe we’re
on the eve of destruction. — Barry McGuire, “Eve of Destruction,”
1965

By Scott Ritter
Truth Dig
March 9, 2018

From 2002 until 2011, Paul Marcarelli, perhaps better known to
American audiences as Verizon’s, “test guy” made a career starring
in television commercials, wandering the width and breadth of the
United States, holding a phone to his ear and asking the simple
question, “Can you hear me now?”

Verizon was, and is, in the communications business in which the
ability to send a message is only as good as the corresponding
ability to receive it.

On Thursday, Vladimir Putin, Russia’s much-maligned president,
delivered his state of the nation address to the Russian Federal
Assembly (the Russian national Legislature, consisting of the State
Duma, or lower house, and the Russian Council, or upper house).

While the first half of his speech dealt with Russian domestic
issues—and any American who has bought into Western media
perceptions that Russia is a collapsing state, possessing a failed
economy, would do well to read this portion of the speech—it
was the second half of the presentation that caused the world
to sit up and listen.

In this portion of the speech, Putin outlined developments
in Russian strategic military capability.

The developments collectively signal the obsolescence of America’s
strategic nuclear deterrence, both in terms of its present
capabilities and—taking into account the $1.2 trillion nuclear
weapons modernization program President Trump unveiled earlier
this year—anything America might pursue in the decades to come.

Some Western observers have derided Putin’s speech as simple
posturing, a manic effort to project Russian power, and with it
global credibility, where none exists.

Such an interpretation would be incorrect.

There should be no doubt among American politicians,
military leaders, and citizens alike.

“Every word has a meaning,” Putin told his audience. The weapons
he referred to are real, and Putin meant every word he said.

“Back in 2000,” he said, “the U.S. announced its withdrawal from
the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Russia was categorically against
this. We saw the Soviet-U.S. ABM Treaty signed in 1972 as the
cornerstone of the international security system. … Together with
the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty [START], the ABM Treaty
not only created an atmosphere of trust but also prevented either
party from recklessly using nuclear weapons, which would
have endangered humankind. … We did our best to dissuade the
Americans from withdrawing from the treaty. All in vain.”

“The U.S. pulled out of the treaty in 2002,” Putin observed.

“Even after that, we tried to develop constructive dialogue with
the Americans. We proposed working together in this area to ease
concerns and maintain the atmosphere of trust. At one point, I
thought that a compromise was possible, but this was not to be.
All our proposals, absolutely all of them, were rejected. And
then we said that we would have to improve our modern strike
systems to protect our security."

In reply, the U.S. said that it is not creating a global BMD [Ballistic
Missile Defense] system against Russia, which is free to do as it
pleases, and that the U.S. will presume that our actions are not
spearheaded against the U.S.”

Building on his well-known position, delivered in his 2005 state of
the nation address, that “the collapse of the Soviet Union was a
major geopolitical disaster of the century” that created “genuine
drama” in which “the epidemic of disintegration infected Russia
itself,” Putin said in his 2018 state of the nation address that
“apparently, our partners got the impression that it was impossible
in the foreseeable historical perspective for our country to revive
its economy, industry, defense industry and armed forces to levels
supporting the necessary strategic potential. And if that is the case,
there is no point in reckoning with Russia’s opinion, it is necessary
to further pursue ultimate unilateral military advantage in order to
dictate the terms in every sphere in the future. …”

“We ourselves are to blame,” Putin said. “All these years, the
entire 15 years since the withdrawal of the United States from
the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, we have consistently tried to
reengage the American side in serious discussions, in reaching
agreements in the sphere of strategic stability.”

However, Putin observed, the United States “is permitting
constant, uncontrolled growth of the number of anti-ballistic
missiles, improving their quality, and creating new missile
launching areas. If we do not do something, eventually this will
result in the complete devaluation of Russia’s nuclear potential.
Meaning that all of our missiles could simply be intercepted.”

Putin pointed out that in 2004, he put the world on notice
about Russia’s intent to defend itself, telling the press:

“As other countries increase the number and quality of their arms
and military potential, Russia will also need to ensure it has new
generation weapons and technology. … [T]his is a very significant
statement because no country in the world as of now has such arms
in their military arsenal.”

“Why did we do all this?” Putin asked his audience, referring to his
2004 comments.

“Why did we talk about it? As you can see, we made no secret of
our plans and spoke openly about them, primarily to encourage our
partners to hold talks. No, nobody really wanted to talk to us about
the core of the problem, and nobody wanted to listen to us. So
listen now. …”

“To those who in the past 15 years have tried to accelerate an arms
race and seek unilateral advantage against Russia, have introduced
restrictions and sanctions that are illegal from the standpoint of
international law aiming to restrain our nation’s development,
including in the military area, I will say this: Everything you have
tried to prevent through such a policy has already happened. No
one has managed to restrain Russia.”

This was a message delivered not just to the Russian Federal
Assembly but to the White House and its temperamental occupant
President Donald Trump, to the halls of Congress, where Russia-
baiting has become a full-time occupation, and to the American
people, who have been caught up in a wave of anti-Russia hysteria
fueled by fantastical claims of a Russian, “attack” on American
democracy which, when balanced against the potential of
thermonuclear annihilation, pales into insignificance.

Putin spoke, and one would hope that throughout America the
modern-day incarnations of Verizon’s Paul Marcarelli are making
their way into the homes of every American citizen and the halls
of power where those the American people elect to represent
them reside, and calling out, “Can you hear me now?”

Based upon the reaction to Putin’s speech so far,
the answer appears to be, “no.”

This refusal to accept the fact that there exists today a
new reality carries with it the potential for catastrophic
miscalculation.

In Pat Frank’s 1959 novel, “Alas, Babylon,” an American Navy
fighter aircraft flying over the Mediterranean Sea fires a missile
that veers off target, striking an ammunition depot near the Syrian
city of Latakia, setting off a massive explosion that the Soviet Union
uses as an excuse to initiate a retaliatory nuclear strike against
the United States.

It doesn’t take a stretch of imagination today to paint a scenario
in which American and Russian forces clash over Syria.

Indeed, a recent incident—in which Syrian militia forces, supported
by Russian private military contractors, advanced toward Syrian oil
and gas fields occupied by U.S.-backed Kurdish fighters, only to be
attacked by American fighter bombers, resulting in hundreds of
casualties, including scores of Russian dead—underscores the fact
that such clashes are no longer theoretical.

Russian and American aircraft patrol the same airspace.

American and Russian troops face off on the ground below.

American forces are charged with implementing a policy that is
diametrically opposed to the one being pursued by their Russian
counterparts.

So far, clashes have been limited to proxies, but it is only
a question of when, not if, American and Russian forces
engage in force-on-force combat.

Syria is not the only geographical point of friction between
the United States and Russia.

Both the Baltic States and Ukraine find American and Russian
forces facing off against one another.

American ships and reconnaissance aircraft probing the waters
and airspace off the Baltic coast and in the Black Sea have been
aggressively challenged by Russian aircraft, oftentimes flying
dangerously close to their American counterparts, prompting then-
Secretary of State John Kerry to declare that the U.S. Navy would
be justified in shooting down the Russians in, “self-defense.”

The almost cavalier ease with which the idea of Russian-American
combat is floated as a possibility by American decision-makers is
born out of a misplaced notion of American military superiority
which, while reflecting an accurate estimate of the situation
10 years ago, is no longer the case today.

After Russia emerged victorious in its short war with the republic of
Georgia in 2008, many shortfalls in communications, organization
and training were revealed that underscored the second-class
nature of the Russian military when compared with the United
States and NATO.

Russia undertook a crash program, restructuring its military units,
professionalizing its ranks, and investing in top-of-the line
equipment, including modern communications.

The Russian military that occupied the Crimea in 2014 was orders of
magnitude better than the one that fought Georgia six years prior.

The Russian military fighting in Syria today (and facing off against
the Americans in the Baltics and Ukraine) is even better.

The United States, in recent years, has transitioned away from
almost exclusively training for low-intensity conflict in Iraq and
Afghanistan, and is once again preparing to fight large-scale
combined arms engagements against “near-peer” forces whose
training and/or equipment is inferior to the American military.

Comments made by U.S. military officers who have recently
deployed to the Baltics make it clear that they believe the
superiority of American arms serves as a deterrence to Russian
regional ambitions.

The reality is, even if Russia were to pursue ill-intent against its
eastern European neighbors that manifested in military aggression
(and there is no indication that this is the case), the notion of
American and NATO ground forces serving as a force in deterrence
is not sustainable.

In fact, in many categories, such as tactical communications,
artillery support and armor employment, the Russians outclass
their American counterparts.

Recent war games show that Russia would defeat NATO
in any conflict in the Baltics.

But the quality of the Russian military is not the point.

What is important, at least in the context of a broader discussion
on comparative nuclear posture, is that 20 years ago, when Russia
was militarily inferior to the United States, the Russian leadership
embraced a policy of nuclear, “de-escalation” which envisioned
the early use of tactical nuclear weapons by Russia to offset the
conventional military advantages enjoyed by the United States
and NATO.

Through this policy, Russia sought to leverage its strong capabilities
in tactical nuclear weapons by making the cost of regional
engagement too high for any potential opponent.

The policy of nuclear de-escalation was born during the time of the
Chechen crisis, in the late 1990s, when Russia feared the possibility
of Western intervention in that conflict.

It served as the backbone of Russia’s nuclear posture in both
2008 and 2014 when Russia intervened in Georgia and Ukraine,
respectively. And it backed up Russia’s decision to intervene
in Syria in 2015.

This Russian nuclear policy was noted in the 2018 U.S. Nuclear
Posture Review which said that, “Russian strategy and doctrine
emphasize the potential coercive and military uses of nuclear
weapons. It mistakenly assesses that the threat of nuclear
escalation or actual first use of nuclear weapons would serve
to ‘de-escalate’ a conflict on terms favorable to Russia.These
mistaken perceptions increase the prospect for dangerous
miscalculation and escalation.”

No truer words could have been written.

And yet, the Trump administration seems in no hurry to undertake
any actions vis-à-vis Russia that would reduce the possibility of any
such miscalculation and escalation.

While noting in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review that, “arms
control can contribute to U.S., allied, and partner security by
helping to manage strategic competition among states,” the
Trump administration went on to declare that, “progress in
arms control is not an end in and of itself, and depends on the
security environment and the participation of willing partners.”

It was as if the entire history of U.S.-Russian arms control referred
to by Putin in his state of the nation address never happened.

But it is not just history the Trump administration clouds over.

The present and future is likewise shrouded in a cloud of wishful
thinking that ignores the progress in Russian strategic capabilities
promised by Putin in 2004 and delivered upon in 2018.

“The United States” the Nuclear Posture Review states, “remains
willing to engage in a prudent arms control agenda. We are
prepared to consider arms control opportunities that return parties
to predictability and transparency, and remain receptive to future
arms control negotiations if conditions permit and the potential
outcome improves the security of the United States and its allies
and partners.”

Noting that, “there is no ‘one size fits all’ for deterrence” the
2018 Nuclear Posture Review states that “the United States will
apply a tailored and flexible approach to effectively deter across
a spectrum of adversaries, threats, and contexts” in order to
“communicate to different potential adversaries that their
aggression would carry unacceptable risks and intolerable costs
according to their particular calculations of risk and cost.”

While not specifically naming Russia, the Trump administration
put Moscow on notice that it “must understand that there are no
possible benefits from non-nuclear aggression or limited nuclear
escalation. … [P]otential adversaries must recognize that across
the emerging range of threats and contexts: 1) the United States
is able to identify them and hold them accountable for acts of
aggression, including new forms of aggression; 2) we will defeat
non-nuclear strategic attacks; and, 3) any nuclear escalation will
fail to achieve their objectives, and will instead result in
unacceptable consequences for them.”

The Russian president heard the message the United States
was communicating.

“We are greatly concerned by certain provisions of the revised
nuclear posture review” Putin said, “which expand the
opportunities for reducing and reduce the threshold for the
use of nuclear arms. Behind closed doors, one may say
anything to calm down anyone, but we read what is written.
And what is written is that this strategy can be put into action
in response to conventional arms attacks and even to a cyber
threat.”

https://www.truthdig.com/articles/are-you-listening-america